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INTRODUCTION
For much of the twentieth century, doctors only recognized pain as a symptom, never
as an illness in itself. 1 As a result, doctors prescribed opioids, such as morphine and
oxycodone, to treat short-term pain, but not to treat chronic pain. 2 Then, in the 1970s,
medical professionals became more interested in managing pain and they began to view
chronic pain as an illness in itself. 3 Although perceptions of chronic pain changed, the
prescription drugs available to treat this illness did not, and doctors remained hesitant to
treat chronic pain with highly addictive opioids. 4
However, things changed in 1996 when pharmaceutical company Purdue Frederick
obtained FDA approval for OxyContin, a time-release, less addictive oxycodone pill
intended to treat chronic pain. 5 Purdue Frederick marketed OxyContin as "difficult to
abuse," in an effort to assuage doctors' fears. 6 Due to this marketing, prescriptions of
opioids quickly skyrocketed, but unfortunately, so did accidental opioid overdoses.7
Despite Purdue Frederick's claims, OxyContin (and other opioid analgesics) was actually
highly susceptible to abuse because it could be "crushed, then swallowed, snorted, or
injected for a powerful high." 8 Several states and individuals sued Purdue Frederick for
misbranding OxyContin as a non-addictive drug. 9 The company ultimately pied guilty
to a felony charge of misbranding and paid over $600 million in fines. 10 But no fine
could remedy the destruction caused by the drug and the nation is still burdened by
opioid abuse.

1
Ian Frazier, The Antidote: Can Staten Island's A1iddle-Class Neighborhoods Defeat An Overdose
Epidemic?, NEw YoRKER (Sept. 8, 2014), http://¥lww.ne\;vyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/08/antidote.

2
Id.; see also Chronic Pain: Symptoms, Diagnosis & Treatment, 6 NIH MEDLINE PLUS 1, 5-6
(2011 ), http://w\'iw.nlmnih.gov/medlineplus/magazine/issues/spring 11/articles/springl 1pg5-6.html
(explaining that short-term pain lasts no longer than twelve weeks and occurs during recovery from
an injury or procedure or during the progression of terminal illness, while chronic pain is "any pain
lasting more than 12 weeks").
3

Frazier, supra note 1.

4

See A Nation in Pain: Focusing On US Opioid Trends for Treatment of Short-Term and LongerTerm Pain 1, 4, EXPRESS ScRJPTS LAB (Dec. 2014), http://lab.express-scripts.com/publications/anation-in-pain (explaining that doctors were reluctant to prescribe opioids because it is easy for
patients to become addicted to them, as the body can build up a tolerance to opioid drugs and such
drugs do not have a maximum clinically safe dosage limit) (hereinafter A Nation in Pain).
5
6

Frazier, supra note L
Id.

7

See Alexandra Sifferlin, The Problem with Treating Pain in America, TrME (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://time.com/3663907/treating-pain-opioids-painkillers/ (explaining that the number of opioid
prescriptions for pain has almost tripled, from 76 million to 219 million between 1991-2011, and the
number of hospitalizations and deaths related to opioid addiction has also increased dramatically).
8

Frazier, supra note 1.

9

Id.

10

Id.; Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, NY TIMES (May 10,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /05/l O/business/l ldrug-web.html? _r=O.
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Prescription opioid overdose death rates quadrupled from 1999-2013. 11 During this
period, almost fifty Americans died from prescription drug overdoses daily. 12 Today,
Americans make up less than 5% of the world's population, but consume more than
80% of the world's opiate supply. 13 Opioid abuse has also imposed significant costs on
the American economy. 14 Fortunately, the United States recently experienced the first
reduction in opioid overdose deaths in over a decade. 15 And some states, like Florida,
have seen a dramatic decrease in overdose deaths, largely because of their initiatives
aimed at curtailing opioid overprescribing. 16
The most successful of these initiatives have been Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs (PD MPs), which are electronic databases that monitor opioid prescriptions.
Because PDMPs have proven to both curb medically unnecessary opioid prescriptions
and reduce opioid mortality, all but one state legislature has enacted legislation to
create a PDMP. 17 The lone holdout is the state of Missouri. Although residents of seven
neighboring states with PDMPs travel to Missouri to procure opioids and Missouri
has become known as "America's Drug Store," its legislature has refused to establish a
PDMP. 18 Conservative lawmakers in Missouri cite patient privacy concerns for their past
refusal to pass a PDMP. In March of 2015, the state's senate passed a bill authorizing
a PDMP, but it contained numerous measures designed to protect patient privacy. The
Missouri senate bill was ultimately not enacted into law, but this Article will argue that
Missouri legislators' concerns about patient privacy are not compelling.
This Article will explain why the Missouri state legislature should pass a statute to
authorize a PDMP. It will then outline why drafting a robust and effective PDMP will
not violate the Constitution, or federal and state privacy regulations.

11

Injury Prevention and Control: Prescription Drug Overdose, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND

PREVENTION, http://v.;w-w.cdc.gov/drngoverdose/data/index.html.
12

Id.

13

A Nation in Pain, supra note 4 at 4.

14

Id. (including $42 billion in lost productivity, $8.2 billion in increased criminal justice costs, $2.2
billion for drug abuse treatment, and $944 million in medical complications).
15

Margaret Warner, Holly Hedegaard, & Li-Hui Chen, Trends in
nu'""'""·' and Heroin: United States, 1999-2012, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Dec. 2014 ), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/drug_poisoning/drug_poisoning.htm
(repmiing a 5% decline in opioid-analgesic overdose deaths between 2011 and 2012).
16

See Hal Johnson et al., Decline in Drug Overdose
State
CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://\YWW.cdc.gov/Illi11V\'T/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6326a3.
htm (stating that overdose deaths from oxycodone have decreased 52. l %, while overall death rates
for prescription
have
decreased 23.2%).
17
Jeffrey Levi et al., Prescription
Strategies to Stop the
2013 1, 16,
TRUST FORAMERJCA's HEALTH, (Oct. 2013), http://healthyamericans.org/reports/drngabuse2013/
TFAH20 l 3RxDrugAbuseRpt l 2_no_embargo .pdf.

18

Alan Schwarz, Missouri Alone in Resisting Prescription
N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2014 ), http://wwvv.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/us/missouri-alone-in-resi sting-prescription-drngdatabase.html?_r=O.
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I. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS: THE BEST
APPROACH FOR LOWERING OPIOID OVERDOSE RATES
In response to increased opioid abuse and overdoses, states have implemented various
regulatory initiatives, including anti-doctor-shopping laws, increased Medicaid
reimbursement for substance abuse treatment, Good Samaritan laws, Naloxone Access
laws, physical exam and ID requirements for opioid prescriptions, Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs, and Pharmacy Lock-in Programs. 19 Many of these initiatives
try to prevent abusers from obtaining multiple prescriptions from different providers.
Two of the most popular initiatives that impact doctor prescribing and patient access to
opioids are anti-doctor shopping laws and Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs. 20
Every state in America has an anti-doctor-shopping law, requiring a patient to disclose
his or her prescription drug history before receiving another prescription from a
different provider. 21 Anti-doctor shopping laws often deter patients from seeking
medically unnecessary opioids from multiple providers. 22 However, once the patient
discloses the information, the provider has the discretion as to whether to prescribe
additional opioids or report suspected abuse. Such laws have a limited impact on
reckless physician prescribing practices. For this reason, every state, except Missouri,
also has a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program. 23
A PDMP is an electronic database, established and operated by the state, which monitors
the prescription and dispensation of controlled substances. 24 Legislation authorizing a
PDMP often addresses which regulatory actor[s] will create the database and collect
and compile the information, as well as the permissible uses of that information. 25 A
state must also allocate funds for the PDMP, although it can obtain supplemental funds
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA). 26
While states' PDMPs vary, they all provide state regulatory bodies, law enforcement
officials, or pharmacists and physicians access to information that will hopefully identify
potential opioid abusers. 27 At least sixteen of the forty-nine states require physicians
19

Levi et aL, supra note 17, at 14-15.

20

Id. at 16.

21

Id. at 21.
Id.

22
23

Id.atl6.

24

Id. at 18.

25

See, e.g., Fla. Stat.§ 893.055 (2015).

26

See Levi et al., supra note 17, at 38
SAMHSA's funding of the Health IT
which
states with grants to use health information
to increase access to PDMP
data); Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Evolution
National All Schedules Prescription Electronic
Reporting Act: A Public
Treatment
and Diversion, 8 PAIN
PHYSICIAN 4, 335, 336 (2005)
that DOJ manages the Harold Rogers l'rc:sc1·1pt10n
Program, which makes $11 million available to states to monitor pre:scr'lpt1on
scheduled listed chemical
27

Levi et al., supra note 17, at 20
nre:scr·mrmn fraut~ rn•,,;'-'''"'• doctor onu'"'""'"'·
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and/ or pharmacists to check a patient's history in a PDMP before enabling that patient
to obtain additional opioids. 28 PDMPs are particularly effective because they target
numerous causal pathways that lead to opioid overdoses - they curb improper doctor
prescribing and patient access to opioids, prevent diversion of drugs, and isolate opioid
addicts for treatment. 29
Opioid overdose deaths have been declining since 2011. 30 While PDMPs are not
possibly the sole cause of this decrease, they clearly have some positive effect. 31 PDMPs
have been particularly beneficial in Florida and Tennessee. After Tennessee enacted it's
PDMP in 2013, the state's number of "high utilizers" of opioids (those most at risk
for opioid overdose) declined by forty-seven percent. 32 Florida, which boasted ninetyeight of the one hundred physicians dispensing the highest volumes of oxycodone in
the country in 2010, experienced similar success. 33 After establishing a PDMP in 2011,
Florida closed down many of these physicians' "pill mills" and as a result, saw a decline
of more than seventeen percent in the number of oxycodone overdose deaths. 34
While PDMPs vary, they are more effective when prescribers, pharmacists, and law
enforcement have more access to program data. 35 When such actors have access to
PDMPs, they can better prevent opioid abuse and overdoses.
Brandeis University's Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Center of Excellence36
has drafted a Model Act, which suggests best practices for PDMPs, provisions of
which are endorsed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 37
The Model Act provides that a prescriber or pharmacist should be able to view a
28

Id. at 20.

29

Id. at 35.

30

See Johnson et al, supra note 16, at 570 (reporting a 16.7% decline in drug overdose deaths
between 2010 and 2012).
31 See id. (acknowledging that it is impossible for the CDC to determine which initiatives were
most responsible for the decline in drug overdose deaths).
32

A Nation in Pain, supra note 4, at 21.

33

Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 569.
Id.

34

35
See id. at 570 (explaining that providers accessed Florida's PDMP 92 times from September
through December of2011, which resulted in a decrease in opioid overdoses).
36
See About the PDMP Center
Brandeis University, http://pdmpexcellence.org/about
(explaining that it is "fm1ded by grants from the US. Department of Justice and Bureau of Justice
Assistance ... [, and] collaborates with a wide variety of PDMP stakeholders, including federal
and state governments and agencies, universities, health departments, and medical and pharmacy
boards").
37 See HHS takes strong steps to address
overdose, death and aei1enaer.1ce,
US. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES (Mar. 26, 2015), http://v.'WW.hhs.gov/about/
news/20 15 /0 3/26/hhs-takes-strong-steps-to-address-opioid-drug-related-overdose-death-anddependence .html (hereinafter HHS Press Release) (explaining that the HHS Secretary believes
PDMP effectiveness will increase as "states adopt more evidence-based PDMP practices such as
collecting data for all controlled substances, proactive reporting to physicians and pharmacists,
interstate data sharing, and integration with other health IT systems to improve provider use"); see
also Susan Chaityn Lebovits, Heller Team Helps Fight Prescription Drug Abuse, BRANDEisNOW
(Mar. 5, 2012), http:!/brandeis.edn/now/2012/march/drngs.html
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patient's full record in the PDMP, before prescribing or dispensing additional opioids
to the patient. 38 Such access helps the prescriber or pharmacist make the (not always
clear) distinction between medically necessary treatment and troubling opioid use. 39
After viewing the patient's record in the PDMP, the prescriber or pharmacist may also
need to obtain additional information from that patient. For example, a patient with
multiple opioid prescriptions - might be abusing those drugs or might be struggling to
consistently access medical care and needs help managing pain stemming from multiple
conditions. 40 But by accessing the PDMP, a prescriber or pharmacist can at least start
the conversation.
The Model Act also provides that each state's PDMP should be interoperable with other
PDMPs and electronic health record databases throughout the country. 41 In addition,
the Model Act makes a PDMP accessible to medical providers' licensing boards, so
they can properly investigate provider misconduct. 42 Not all states have adopted these
updates in the Model Act, but as political pressure intensifies to curb opioid overdoses,
more states should make these legislative changes to craft more effective PDMPs.

II. WHAT'S THE DEAL, MISSOURI?
As forty-nine states look for ways to improve the effectiveness of their established
PDMPs, the Missouri legislature still refuses to authorize a PDMP. 43 Additionally, the
Missouri legislature has only adopted three countermeasures to reduce opioid overdose
while most states have adopted six or more. 44 Because of the legislature's refusal to
act, in 2010, Missouri had the seventh highest prescription drug overdose mortality
rate in the country. 45 And since 1999, drug overdose deaths in the state have tripled. 46

38

Prescription Drug Epidemic: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism, 112th
Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of John L Eadie, Director, Prescription Monitoring Program Center of
Excellence) (hereinafter Prescription Drug Epidemic).
39

See Christopher A. Griggs, et al., Prescription Drug l'vfonitoring Programs: Examining
Limitations and Future Approaches, 16 WEST J. EMERG. MED. 67, 68 (2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4307729/ (detailing current challenges in evaluating patient data and
proposing how to make PD MPs more effective).
40 Id.
41

See Prescription Drug Epidemic, supra note 38, at 5; see also Levi et al., supra note 17, at 37
(explaining that for a PD MP to be effective, "healthcare providers and law enforcement agencies
[must] be able to share information across state and jurisdictional boundaries").

42

Prescription Drug Epidemic, supra note 38, at 7.

43

See Schwarz, supra note 18 (explaining that although many states have a PDMP, the legislation
varies as to who has access to the database).
44

See Levi et al, supra note 17, at 16-17 (explaining that Missouri ( 1) requires a patient to submit
to a physical exam before obtaining a prescription for opioid analgesics; (2) criminalizes the nondisclosure of existing opioid prescriptions to a new provider; and (3) "locks in" any Medicaid
beneficiary suspected of misusing controlled substances with a single provider and pharmacist).
45

Id. at 12. This paper argues that any state benefits from establishing a PDMP that can serve as
a central repository of patients' prescriptions for opioids. However, the paper recognizes that other
factors, including age, social structure, and poverty- may affect a given state's prescription d:mg
overdose rates. Those other factors are compelling, but beyond the scope of this Article.
46 Id.
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Residents of neighboring states have even started traveling to Missouri to fill their
opioid prescriptions. 47
The lack of a PDMP in Missouri has even brought national attention. In 2012, the
Director of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy visited Missouri
and urged the state legislature to establish a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program. 48
Some lawmakers have proposed legislation to create a PDMP, but conservatives have
struck them down, 49 citing patient privacy concerns.so However, Missourians are
growing tired of the legislature's excuses. For example, in February 2015, activists from
the Missouri Network for Opiate Reform and Recovery carried a coffin filled with 1,000
pill bottles bearing the names of victims of fatal overdoses to the state capitol building,
to build political pressure.s 1
On April 2, 2015, the state senate passed a bill that would authorize a Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program.s 2 The legislation died in the Missouri House Select Committee
on Insurance,s 3 but even if it passed, the resulting PDMP would have been largely
ineffective. The proposed bill would have authorized the Missouri Department of Health
and Senior Services to establish and run a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.s 4 It
would have permitted any provider to report prescriptions for opioids to the database.
In contrast, it would have required every pharmacist to report every filled prescription
to the database.ss After submitting information to the database, a pharmacist would
have received a response from the department, indicating whether the pharmacist should
have any concern about giving the controlled substance to the patient.s 6 If the agency
indicated any reason for concern, however, the pharmacist would have been permitted

47

Schwarz, supra note 18.

48

Cameron Hardesty, Director Kerlikowske Visits Missouri; Urges Adoption ofPrescription Drug
Monitoring Program, THE WHITE HousE (Aug. 17, 2012 11: l 7AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2012/08/17 /director-kerlikowske-visits-missouri-urges-adoption-prescription-drug-monitoringpro.
49 Id.

so See, e.g. Kyle Loethen, Missouri Senate Passes Prescription Drug lvlonitoring, M1ssouRINET
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://WW\¥.missourinet.com/2015/04/06/missouri-senate-passes-prescription-drugmonitoring-program/ (citing 011e senator's disapproval of systems that collect personal data from
individuals who have not committed crimes).
51 Grant Bissell,
with Pill Bottles Going to the Missouri Capitol, KSDK (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://wvvwksdk.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/24/coffin-with-pill-bottles-going-to-mocapitol/23922245/.
52

S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015).

53

See Current Bill Summary: SB. 63, MISSOURI SENATE, http://www.senate.mo.gov/15info/BTS_
Web/Bi!Laspx?SessionType=R&Bil!ID= 156 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (showing that the last action
on the bill was a third reading in the House on May 15, 2015).
54

See S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (proposing that the agency would use the
system to monitor all schedule H-IV controlled substances licensed and prescribed in the state).
ss Id.

56

Id. (stating that dispenser will obtain a response from department after transferring information
to the database, but not explaining how long it will take to receive such a response).
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to use his or her judgment as to whether to prescribe the drug. 57 The proposed bill also
would have imposed numerous regulatory prohibitions on access to the database: it
would have prohibited providers and pharmacists from accessing the data58 ; would have
disallowed combining information from the database with patient Electronic Health
Records data59 ; and would have banned the entry of information from the state PDMP
into the national PDMP. 60
Although the proposed bill represented a huge step forward for the Missouri Senate, it
did not follow the PDMP Model Act and if passed, it would have created an ineffective
PDMP. 61 The bill did not mandate that providers actually use the database, which
researchers believe is a key attribute of a successful PDMP. 62 Furthermore, denying
prescribers and dispensers access to the database would have undermined these
professionals' ability to treat their patients, and could have resulted in the unwarranted
denial of opioids to patients who need them. 63 The proposed bill also would have
banned interoperability between the Missouri database and Electronic Health Records 64
although research suggests that information sharing between EHRs and PDMPs
improves physicians' prescribing decisions. 65 Finally, Missouri's proposed bill would
have prevented the PDMP from sharing information with the national database, which
would have combated interstate doctor shopping. 66
III. IS PRIVACY REALLY A BARRIER?

Missouri's proposed bill would have restricted access to the PDMP primarily to "take
doctors out of the equation [and not] make them into policemen."67 However, public
health surveillance activities, such as PDMPs, are not a new form of governance and
57

Id. (stating that the department will express concern but that it is up to the dispenser to make a
final judgment).
58

Id. (noting that "dispensers and prescribers are not required to access the database and they are
only to input data, not access information").
59

Id. (noting that dispenser and prescriber data will not be mixed \mth other databases").

60

Id. (noting that the infonnation will not be linked \>rith other state databases into a national
database).
61

See Prescription Drug Epidemic, supra note 39, at 4 (recommending several features for a
PDMP, which Missouri's proposed bill did not include).

62 See, e.g., Levi et al., supra note 17, at 16 (giving greater esteem to state laws that mandate PDMP
use).
63 See Prescription
i'.,pzde'fm.s, supra note 39, at 5 (stating that "PD MPs [should] provide
prescription histories to prescribers so they can make clinically sound decisions prior to issuing
prescriptions for controlled substances and can avoid being duped by doctor shoppers").
64

S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015)

65

See Levi et al., supra note 17, at 38 (noting that combining electronic health record data and
PDMP data improves the quality of prescription drug information available and allows rapid access
to such information).
66

Id. at 37 (arguing that shared information benefits state health systems and that 44 states
share PD MP data \>rith other states \>rith 19 states requiring individuals to request the state obtain
information from another state).
67

Bissell, supra note 52.
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have been used by public health departments as an effective means to combat both
infectious and chronic disease. 68 Furthermore, courts have resoundingly upheld the
legality of surveillance by public health agencies, pharmacists, and providers because
patients feel little harm. 69 These public health activities, however, have not been without
controversy. Individuals with the same privacy concerns as the Missouri legislature
have unsuccessfully challenged public health surveillance activities under both the Due
Process Clause and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 70
Missouri legislators opposing establishment ofa PDMP have posited that such programs
abridge individuals' freedoms. 71 Such liberty concerns are generally analyzed under the
Due Process Clause. 72 However, the Supreme Court resolved such privacy arguments
in 1977. 73 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
protected an individual's right to privacy in his or her health information, but ultimately
upheld the government's collection of health information so long as it was adequately
secured. 74 In later decisions, courts interpreted Whalen as conferring a limited right
to privacy. 75 Courts now evaluate public health surveillance activities by balancing
an individual's privacy interest against the government's interest in collecting the

68

See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GosnN & LINDSEY F. ·WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAw: PowER, DuTY &
RESTRAINT- CHAPTER 9: SURVEILLANCE & PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 28 (forthcoming 2016) (hereinafter
Gostin & Wiley, Surveillance & Public Health Law) (explaining that in 2006, the New York City
Board of Health responded to a diabetes epidemic by requiring laboratories (but not physicians) to
report hemoglobinAIC test results to the city).
69 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, "Police" Powers and Public Health Paternalism: HIV and Diabetes
Surveillance, 37 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 9, 10 (2007) (arguing that patients have limited ammunition in
their arguments over the privacy aspects of public health data because of the many benefits that such
disclosures can bring).
70

See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).

71

See, e.g., Loethen, supra note 50 (citing one state senator's argument that "whenever you take an
innocent person's information and put it in a database[,] that takes away their liberty that takes away
their freedoms").
72

Loethen, supra note 50.

73

See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-604 (upholding a New York statute that required prescriptions
of Schedule II drugs to be prepared on an official form, which identified the patient's name and
address).
74
See id. at 601 (holding that the impact of the release of patient identification on their reputation
and independence was not sufficient to constitute an invasion of their Fourteenth Amendment
privacy rights).

75

See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-459 (1977) (stating that when there is
a govermnent interest at stake, any disclosure of private matters must be weighed against the public
interest); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (advocating that recordkeeping
and reporting mandates aimed at preserving the mother's health are permissible if they respect
patient privacy); Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (reaffirming
the two privacy interests in Whalen, the individual interest in avoiding the dissemination of private
matters and the interest in preserving independence in making important decisions).
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data. 76 Since HHS has declared opioid abuse to be a national epidemic, 77 the Missouri
government most likely has a compelling interest in authorizing a Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program. Furthermore, patients feel little harm if information is only
shared between medical providers and public health agencies. 78 Also, most authorizing
legislation for PDMPs, including the Missouri Senate Bill 79 , requires data collected by
government agencies to be encrypted, which would limit the risk of privacy breaches
and meet the adequate surveillance test enunciated in Whalen. 80
It is clear, under the prevailing balancing test for evaluating public health surveillance,

that Missouri's interest in opioid prescribing information would outweigh any invasion
of patients' privacy and would justify the Missouri Senate's proposed PDMP legislation.
Missouri's legislature could even pass more robust legislation, which would share the
PDMP's information with providers, without violating health information privacy
protections conferred by the Due Process Clause.
Opponents of PDMPs also argue that PDMPs violate privacy laws. However, the federal
privacy law, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 81 and
Missouri's privacy regulations 82 both authorize protected health information to be
authorized for patient treatment and public health surveillance purposes.
Upon passing HIPAA in 1996, Congress directed the Secretary ofHHS to promulgate final
regulations "governing standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable
health information" within 42 months of the enactment of the Act. 83 In response, HHS
published its final privacy rules in December of 2000. 84 The privacy regulations only

76
See, e.g., United States v.
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)
(establishing the balancing factors to be considered when justifying whether to intrude on an
individual's privacy: type of record requested; the information it does or may contain; potential
harm resulting from nonconsensual disclosure; injury resulting from disclosure to the relationship
in which lhe record was generated; adequacy of the safeguards to prevent disclosure; the urgency
of need for access; and the existence of a statutory, public policy, or public interest justification for
access).

77

See HHS Press Release, supra note 37.

78

See Gostin, supra note 69, at 10 (arguing that patients are not impacted by this intrusion on their
privacy).
79
S.B. 63, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). (stating that "all communications and data
transmitted [to and from the proposed PDMP] shall be encrypted").

80

See Gostin & Wiley, Surveillance & Public Health Law, supra note 68, at 16 (explaining that the
Whalen court determined that the state had adequate security measures in place, such as keeping
computer tapes in a locked cabinet, operating the computer off-line to prevent unauthorized access,
and disclosing data to only a limited munber of officials).
81

45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2014); see also Richard Sobel, The
HIPAA Paradox: The Privacy Rule Thats Not, 37 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 40, 40 (Aug. 2007)
(explaining that the HIPAA Privacy Rule is not absolute, but rather, sets forth which disclosures are
required and permitted).
82

Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 70-1.010 et seq. (2015).

83
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apply to "covered entities" (including doctors, pharmacists, and HMOs) 85 , and prohibit
these entities from disclosing "protected health information" (PHI) 86 without patient
permission unless a regulatory exception applies. Covered entities, however, may share
"de-identified information" and can sometimes permissively disclose PHI. 87 HIPAA
authorizes permissive disclosure of PHI for "public health activities," 88 and so, the
creation of a public health surveillance system to monitor opioid prescriptions would be
permitted under federal regulations. In the Final Rule, HHS explained that it permitted
these exceptions because an individual's right to privacy is "not absolute." 89
However, HIPAA is only a "floor" of legal protection over each individual's protected
health information; any state may pass more restrictive legislation if it chooses. 90
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze whether a particular state's privacy laws would
authorize a PDMP. Missouri has similar, but arguably stricter, privacy regulations in
comparison to HIPAA. 91 Missouri mandates disclosure of contagious disease, firearm
injuries, medication reactions, work-related injuries, and birth and death information;
however, it does not have a broad authority for permissive disclosure of "public health
activities." 92 The number of authorities for mandatory disclosure of PHI in the Missouri
regulations is significant and reflects the notion that the state must overcome individuals'
privacy concerns in order to address threats to public health. However, under the Missouri
regulations, disclosure of PHI related to opioid prescriptions could not be disclosed to the

85

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2000) (defining a "covered entity" as "(1) a "health plan; (2) a health care
clearinghouses,; (3), a health care provider who transmit any health information in electronic form
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86
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87
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Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services under their mandatory disclosure
authority, which is limited to specific public health surveillance purposes. 93
However, both HIPAA and the Missouri privacy regulations permit disclosure of
protected health information for "treatment" purposes. HIPAA provides that a covered
entity (e.g., a physician or hospital) may disclose protected health information about an
individual in order to treat the individual, and can consult with other health care providers
about courses oftreatment. 94 The Missouri regulations also permit the disclosure of PHI
for treatment purposes in accordance with HIPAA. 95 The Missouri regulations provide
an expansive definition of what "treatment" warrants PHI disclosure. 96
Furthermore, the Missouri Senate Bill's proposed PDMP would not have violated
HIPAA or the Missouri regulations, because it would have only required pharmacists
and permitted providers to use the database for treatment purposes (e.g., deciding
whether to fill prescriptions for opioids ). If the Missouri legislature goes further and
creates a PDMP following the Model Act, that would not violate HIPAA or the state's
privacy regulations because the PDMP's central purpose would be to identify and treat
patients who are addicted to opioids. 97

CONCLUSION
The Missouri legislature's inability to pass a PDMP has contributed to increasing opioid
overdose rates in both Missouri and surrounding states. 98 But as a late adopter of this
public health measure, the state legislature also has a unique opportunity to build on
evidence-based practices to craft a resoundingly effective PDMP. Unfortunately, the
state senate passed a largely toothless bill that the house rejected, allegedly because of
concerns with patient privacy. 99 But these concerns are unfounded, as the right to patient
privacy is not absolute, 100 and even the most expansive PDMP legislation (e.g., the
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PMP Model Act) does not violate the privacy protections afforded by the Constitution,
HIPAA, and Missouri state regulations. 101
Unfortunately, patient privacy protections are not the only barrier to passing authorizing
legislation in Missouri; some of the state's conservative lawmakers also seem generally
distasteful of people addicted to drugs. 102 However, such lawmakers should overcome
such biases and join the national fight against opioid overdoses. Since Missouri does
not have a PDMP, its legislature could and should adopt a PDMP similar to the PDMP
envisioned in the Model Act. 103 The legislature must mandate, consistent with the
Model Act, that both prescribers and pharmacists have full access to the database and
must report each prescription written or dispensed to the database. 104 The Act should
also permit interoperability with the state's electronic health records system and the
national prescription monitoring database to help doctors better treat their patients and
to combat interstate doctor shopping. 105 By adopting these measures, Missouri will see
a significant reduction in opioid overdoses and could become a national leader in the
fight against opioid overdose.
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